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Adversaries are capable of adding perturbations to an im-
age to fool machine learning models into incorrect predic-
tions. One approach to defending against such perturbations
is to apply image preprocessing functions to remove the ef-
fects of the perturbation. Existing approaches tend to be de-
signed orthogonally to the content of the image and can be
beaten by adaptive attacks. We propose a novel image pre-
processing technique called Essential Features that trans-
forms the image into a robust feature space that preserves
the main content of the image while significantly reducing
the effects of the perturbations. Specifically, an adaptive
blurring strategy that preserves the main edge features of
the original object along with a k-means color reduction
approach is employed to simplify the image to its k most
representative colors. This approach significantly limits the
attack surface for adversaries by limiting the ability to ad-
just colors while preserving pertinent features of the origi-
nal image. We additionally design several adaptive attacks
and find that our approach remains more robust than pre-
vious baselines. On CIFAR-10 we achieve 64% robustness
and 58.13% robustness on RESISC45, raising robustness by
over 10% versus state-of-the-art adversarial training tech-
niques against adaptive white-box and black-box attacks.
The results suggest that strategies that retain essential fea-
tures in images by adaptive processing of the content hold
promise as a complement to adversarial training for boost-
ing robustness against adversarial inputs.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models have been used for a large
diversity of image classification algorithms. These mod-
els, however, have been shown to be vulnerable to subtle
adversarial attacks [3, 7, 13, 14, 19, 27] that threaten the
safety and real-world practicality of such systems. Attacks
now range from digital attacks such as the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [14] and Projected Gradient Descent
(a) Attacked airplane im-
age classified as sparse
residential area
(b) Essential Features
transformed version of 1a
that removes perturbation
effects, now classified as
airplane
Figure 1: Example Essential Features transformation.
(PGD) [22] to physical-world attacks such as Expectation
over Transformation (EoT) [3] and Robust Physical Per-
turbations (RP2) [13] that can generate physical stickers to
carry out an attack.
Understanding how to defend machine learning models
remains a challenge despite an increasingly large literature
of defense design [12, 15, 22, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35]. As at-
tack and defense algorithms have evolved over the years, a
somewhat patch-work approach has prevented us from clos-
ing the gap between what a machine learning model and a
human think is important for a small change in an input.
Adversarial training-based techniques [22, 30, 33, 34, 35]
have been effective strategies in increasing robustness, but
a large gap between clean accuracy and adversarial accu-
racy still remains.
Early approaches to designing defenses to adversarial at-
tack included image preprocessing techniques such as JPEG
compression [10, 12, 15], color-bit reduction [15, 31], and
blurring [31]. However, one significant limitation of these
works is that they did not analyze adaptive attacks that
considered the added image preprocessing function. In
fact, these defenses and many more were broken in sub-
sequent papers with adaptive attacks. Typically, such non-























a technique known as Backwards Pass Differentiable Ap-
proximation (BPDA) [2], where in the backwards gradient
calculation the preprocessing function is estimated with a
differentiable function. Oftentimes, the identity function
suffices for this purpose [2]. Another intellectual limitation
of these defenses is that they aimed to clean up the entire
image in the same way without discriminating between the
pertinent object and the rest of the background, meaning
that some good features of the object were likely destroyed.
In this paper, we propose a content-based image prepro-
cessing approach called Essential Features that aims to sig-
nificantly reduce the attack surface available to adversaries
and also remains robust to adaptive attacks. Our adaptive
blurring and color clustering reduction strategy preserves
the main features of an image and reduces the ability to
usefully perturb non-feature areas. We first apply an adap-
tive blurring strategy that adaptively chooses smaller blur
kernels around strong edges and larger blur kernels in the
absence of edges, preserving the important edge features
of the main object but otherwise blurs to remove high fre-
quency perturbations. Note that we threshold edges in such
a manner that it is difficult for an adversary to add edges un-
der small L∞ norm ball restrictions. After blurring, we ap-
ply k-means color reduction [17] to reduce the image into k
representative colors. This function transforms images into
a more robust feature space that is difficult to attack and can
be used effectively in adversarial training.
We show that our approach is more robust to BPDA
attacks and other adaptive attacks than existing adversar-
ial training techniques. We apply adaptive attack lessons
learned in [28] to show that our defense cannot be easily
broken by adaptive attack strategies as well. To demon-
strate the efficacy of our method, we perform experiments
on CIFAR-10 [18] and RESISC45 [8], raising the adversar-
ial robustness for each. We test on adaptive PGD attacks as
well as a black-box hard-label attack (OPT-attack [9]). We
show that Essential Features raises adversarial accuracy to
64% for CIFAR-10 (versus 46.07% for a Madry adversar-
ial trained model [22]) and 58.13% for RESISC45 (versus
35.71% for Madry adversarial trained model).
Contributions:
1. We propose a novel, content-preserving transformation
called Essential Features that applies adaptive blur-
ring and k-means color reduction to clean up high fre-
quency perturbations while preserving important edges
and primary color information necessary for classifica-
tion.
2. We develop adaptive attacks to our Essential Features
approach and use this robust feature space in combina-
tion with adversarial training.
3. We evaluate our defense against adaptive white-box
and black-box attacks and show that our defense is
more robust to L∞ attacks than state-of-the-art adver-
sarially trained models.
The empirical evidence from applying Essential Fea-
tures on these popular datasets indicates that such an adap-
tive preprocessing technique to find essential features in im-
ages is a promising strategy to complement standard adver-
sarial training and the combination can result in significant
boosts in robustness to state-of-the-art adaptive adversar-
ial attacks. Thus, such image preprocessing strategies as
Essential Features merits further exploration for designing
more robust models despite failure of earlier preprocessing
techniques such as JPEG compression, color-bit reduction,
and non-adaptive blurring against adaptive adversarial at-
tacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the most relevant related work in
adversarial image defenses. Section 3 motivates and de-
tails the Essential Features approach. In Section 4, we de-
scribe the experimentation, including results on adaptive at-
tacks. Finally, we discuss the implication of our approach
and summarize our findings.
2 Related Work
Our work is primarily related to image preprocessing
defenses and adversarial training. We aim to address the
flaws of current image preprocessing defenses and lever-
age adversarial training to achieve increased robustness. We
briefly describe these and the relation to our work.
Image Preprocessing Defenses: Image preprocessing ap-
proaches seek to remove adversarial perturbations through
image processing techniques (e.g., image blurring or sharp-
ening). Once processed, the resulting image is handed to
the machine learning model. The goal of such image pre-
processing techniques is to both not affect the accuracy in
classifying non-adversarial images as well as improving the
classification accuracy of adversarially tampered images.
Several preprocessing defenses include color-bit reduc-
tion [15, 31], JPEG compression [10, 12, 15], and a non-
differentiable pixel deflection approach [23]. These image
preprocessing algorithm defenses were broken with simple
applications of BPDA with the identity function as the back-
wards approximation [1, 2]. Xu et al. additionally propose
filtering defenses but do not present adaptive attacks. Un-
like our adaptive blurring, their filters are fixed. Liang et al.
propose a per image adaptive detection approach that blurs
each image based on its entropy [21]. In contrast, we pro-
pose a defense that outputs correct predictions in the face of
attacks and blurs adaptively within an image.
Jalalpour et al. [17] first proposed the notion of using k-
means color reduction to thwart adversarial attacks. We will
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also use k-means color reduction; however, Jalalpour et al.
did not adversarially train networks with k-means color re-
duced images. We additionally add adaptive Gaussian blur-
ring in front of the color reduction rather than normal Gaus-
sian blurring. Finally, we also note that color-bit reduction
effectively truncates color bits to decrease the number of
colors while we select k representative colors to reduce to.
The key difference is that color-bit reduction splits the color
space into evenly spaced values, some of which may not be
in the image itself. The k representative colors approach
adapts the chosen colors to the image itself.
Adversarial Training: Adversarial training is a commonly
used class of defense approaches that train classifiers under
attacked images to raise robustness. The goal is that train-
ing on adversarial images will result in a hardened classi-
fier. Adversarial training poses a min-max problem where
we minimize the classifier’s loss over the strongest pertur-
bations we can generate within the perturbation space [22].








L(θ, x+ δ, y)
])
where x is an input image, y is the label, D is the data dis-
tribution, δ is the perturbation, S is the allowable space of
perturbations, L is the loss function, and θ are the model
parameters.
A standard baseline is Madry-style Adversarial train-
ing [22], which trains classifiers on Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD) [22] attacks generated at each epoch. While
effective, one limitation of adversarial training is that it is
slow and hard to scale [20], so other approaches have tried
to speed up adversarial training while retaining comparable
accuracy [25, 30, 33, 34, 35].
3 Approach
Our proposed approach creates a feature space transfor-
mation that reduces the attack surface of adversaries. The
overall goal is to clean up high-range and low-range fre-
quency changes and simplify the image down to human-
vision inspired representation. We thus call our approach
Essential Features. In combination with adaptive attacks,
we can adversarially train on this transformation and treat it
as a more robust feature space.
3.1 Motivating Essential Features
Adversaries target small color changes to introduce fea-
tures that will change classification. The goal of our pro-
posed Essential Features approach is to minimize the attack
surface through image preprocessing techniques. Our ap-
proach is built upon the following observations:
• Adversarial noise is typically added to push a classi-
fier in a certain direction. As shown in Figure 3, often
the adversarial noise is primarily placed in areas with
no or non-essential features. Figure 3a is a natural im-
age (class airplane), while Figure 3b is an adversarial
image that is classified as snowberg1 with probability
1. To make the image a snowberg, adversarial noise is
added to the tarmac regions of the image.
• Smoothing or blurring with large Gaussian kernels
ameliorates the effects of adversarial noise. Larger
smoothing kernels, however, also remove real features
of the pertinent object.
• Smoothing with small Gaussian kernels retains real
features but cannot blur the adversarial noise far
enough, allowing adversarial perturbations to remain
strong enough to fool classifiers. The delicate balance
between smoothing to remove adversarial noise and
keeping features for classification is shown in Figure 4.
In (a), smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of size 3 (and
5, not shown)) is insufficient to mask the adversarial
noise and the image is still classified as a snowberg. In
(b), at a Gaussian kernel size of 7 (and 9, not shown),
the adversarial noise is masked sufficiently enough and
the image is classified as a runway. Unfortunately, at
this smoothing level, insufficient details remain from
the airplanes. At Gaussian kernel size 11, insufficient
details remain and the image is classified as a cloud.
• Many preprocessing algorithms have been shown to
be weak against adaptive attacks. Once an adversary
has access to the algorithm they can iteratively cre-
ate a stronger attack that adapts to the defense to de-
feat it. Adversarial noise removing techniques needs
to at least survive BPDA, where the gradient of a non-
differentiable function is estimated with an approxima-
tion function.
Our approach, termed Essential Features, cuts down the
attack surface available to adversaries considerably. We
take a two component approach to clean up high-range and
low-range frequency changes and simplify the image down
to a human-vision inspired representation. That is, retaining
important shape features while restricting the ability to add
noise elsewhere [29]. Ideally for the image in Figure 3a,
small Gaussian kernels would be used to minimally smooth
area with strong features and larger Gaussian kernels to blur
areas that are deemed featureless. In Figure 5a, we show an
example where we apply Gaussian blurring with kernel size
3 on only the airplanes (the three small splotches in Fig-
ure 3b) and Gaussian blurring with kernel size 13 on the
1”snowberg” is one of the classes in the RESISC45 dataset, with an
example of a snowberg shown in Figure 3(c).
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Figure 2: The Essential Features transformation pipeline. First, a Sobel response map is calculated. Then, the map is
thresholded to select blur kernels to use. We then compute an adaptively blurred image. Finally, we apply k-means color









Figure 3: Placing of adversarial noise. Classifications re-







Figure 4: Gaussian blurring examples. Classifications re-
ported as (class, confidence). Gaussian blurring with a fixed
Gaussian kernel size as a preprocessing step fails to defend
against adaptive adversarial attacks, regardless of the cho-
sen kernel size.
rest of the image. This image is classified correctly as air-
plane with confidence 0.993. Essential Features seeks to
perform such blurring algorithmically, rather than by hand
as in this example.
Essential Features consists of two primary components:
• Adaptive blurring: Applying an adaptive Gaussian
blurring process to preserve edges, we are able to ef-
fectively apply a higher level of blurring in the middle
of an object than we would with regular Gaussian blur-




Figure 5: Motivating example. Classifications reported as
(class, confidence). Different levels of blurring using differ-
ent Guassian kernels in different portion of images causes
the state-of-the-art adaptive attacks to fail. In (a), the vari-
ous Guassian kernels and the regions to apply them to were
hand-crafted. Essential Features algorithm automates this
preprocessing defense with result shown in (b).
ring. This makes it even harder for an adversary to add
noise in the middle of an object while preserving nec-
essary edge features for classification.
• K-means color reduction: Rather than having 255 · 3
possible colors for each pixel independently, an at-
tacker is limited to trying to influence the k possible
colors set across the entire image. The goal of this
component is to force colors that are similar to a sin-
gle color, removing the ability of adversaries to subtly
perturb pixel values.
An example output of Essential Features is shown in Fig-
ure 5b. The image is correctly classified with confidence
0.997. We argue that this transformation leads to a feature
space that is closer to human vision. Patches of a similar
color are now represented with one or maybe a few max
different colors in terms of pixels. Edge features are critical
to human vision [29] and we effectively transform images
to a feature space that consists of the edges that make up
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the object and the general color of each patch in the image,
which reflects more human-style semantics of what an ob-
ject consists of.
3.2 Adaptive Gaussian Blurring
Applying Gaussian blurring removes high frequency
changes an adversary may attempt to add [24, 31] but may
additionally blur edges that make up the shape of the object
in question or other fine details. Thus, we propose an adap-
tive Gaussian blurring approach, which attempts to preserve
pertinent edges by selecting smaller kernels in areas with a
high edge map response and selecting larger kernels in large
patches of roughly the same color.
3.2.1 Computing Edges
We compute an edge response map by taking the gradient
magnitude of the standard Sobel [4] filters in the x and y
directions. We compute the Sobel edge response maps on
each color channel separately.
We choose Sobel edge response maps over the use of
Canny Edge Detection [5] for two reasons. The first is that
we want more control over the ability to respond differently
to weak edges such as textures in a patch of grass that may
be picked up versus the pertinent edges that make up the
outline of the main object against the background. The sec-
ond is that we want an efficient computation that we could
use in adversarial training.
3.2.2 Adaptive Kernel Thresholding
Once an edge map has been computed, we then adaptively
blur the image with different Gaussian kernels based on the
edge response in that area. To preserve the edges, we want
to apply little blur on edge pixels and lots of blur on pixels
in the middle of an object. Furthermore, pixels near edges
cannot use too large of a kernel, otherwise it risks somewhat
blurring the edge still.
To accomplish adaptive Gaussian, we first blur the edge
response map with a small Gaussian kernel, to have a
slightly sloped effect to the edges. This makes it more likely
we will still use a smaller kernel around the edges, but pos-
sibly larger than pixels actually on an edge itself.
Once the edge map has been blurred slightly we then
adaptively blur the image itself. We choose a predeter-
mined, fixed set of kernels to choose from. Then, starting
from the largest such kernel, we apply a series of thresholds,
where each threshold met decreases the size of the kernel.
(These thresholds are set as hyperparameters and are spec-
ified in Section 4.1 for our experiments). Thus, in an area
with no edges, we apply the most blur, and then for stronger
and stronger edges, we apply less and less blur. This process
is applied on each color channel separately. An example of
this blurring is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, we have
shown only the bottom half of the image for easier visual in-
spection. We note that there are very strong edges near the
plane, weak edges in the details on the right, and no edges in
the middle. As shown in the figure, the resulting image on
the lower right consists of pixels that come from one of the
three different blurred images; the areas between the planes
do not have any edge information and derive their values
from the blur=13 image, while pixels near the edges of the
plane derive their pixel values from the blur=3 image.
3.3 k-means Color Reduction
Once the adaptive Gaussian blurring has been com-
pleted, we apply k-means color reduction as seen in
Jalalpour et al. [17]. This selects a representative set of
k colors that it will use for the whole image, replacing each
pixel in the image with the closest color in the set by Eu-
clidean distance. The set of k colors is chosen by applying
k-means clustering over the whole image, finding centers of
k clusters which minimizes the reconstruction error when
undergoing this process. We use the “Fast” process as sug-
gested in Jalalpour et al. . [17] which computes the clusters
on a small thumbnail of the image for speed purposes, al-
though we use different sized thumbnails. k is chosen as a
hyperparameter.
The effect of k-means color reduction is that it makes it
harder for an adversary to add a lot of new colors, as this
transformation will attempt to simplify the color palette to
the k most representative colors. Compared with Jalalpour
et al. [17] where the k-means step follows Gaussian blur-
ring, we preserve more of the object edge features for the
network to utilize when making its decision. As such, we
aim to preserve edges, which we presume to be impor-
tant features that make up an object, as well has capturing
the rough color of each part of the image, without allow-
ing many different tuples of perceptually similar colors that
could be impacted with small adversarial noise.
3.4 Adaptive Attacks and Adversarial Training
With existing image preprocessing defenses being break-
able under adaptive attacks, a research question is whether
Essential Features can survive adaptive attacks, where an
adversary knows our preprocessing strategy. Our strategy
for generating strong adaptive attacks for Essential Fea-
tures is to apply the backwards pass differentiable approx-
imation (BPDA) [2] approach since the Essential Features
preprocessing algorithm is non-differentiable. We try two
different approaches for the approximation function g(x) of
BPDA [2] to overcome this non-differentiability. The first
is to set g(x) to the identity function for the entire prepro-
cessing transform. As the transform aims to preserve the
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Figure 6: Adaptive Gaussian application example. Based on a thresholded Sobel edge response map, differing amounts of
blur are applied to the final image. A kernel is picked for each pixel with larger Gaussian blur kernels such as 13 in areas
with low edge response and smaller Gaussian blur kernels such as 3 in areas with high edge response. Each color channel is
processed independently.
overall structure of the image and instead aims to clean up
redundant and added noise to the image, an identity func-
tion is arguably a reasonable approximation function. The
second is to approximate only the k-means step in the trans-
form with the identity function but then take derivatives
through the adaptive blurring step. Concretely, for each
possible blur kernel size s we take the pixels where s was
chosen and backpropagate them through the differentiable
Gaussian blur function. We then sum all of these gradients
together and take this as the final gradient. We find that
this second approach results in more effective attacks than
the first approach and refer to this approach as BPDA+AG
(where AG stands for Adaptive Gaussian). Figure 7 shows
examples of BPDA+AG attacks along with the Essential
Features transformed version.
We explored a few other adaptive white-box attack
strategies but they were no better than the BPDA+AG at-
tack. The first alternative attack tried adding an additional
term to the attack objective function to maximize the aver-
age Sobel map response to encourage the adversary to add
edges. We note that due to edge thresholding in the adap-
tive kernel selection (Section 3.2.2) the attacker is not able
to add very much to the edge response within small L∞
ball limits, which limits the ability to attack the image by
adding lots of strong edges. The second alternative attack
tried to add a Non Printability Score [26] to encourage the
attack to use very few colors. We tried using the set of col-
ors used in [13] and from the palette generated by k-means
on the original input image, but neither improved the attack
success rate.
4 Experiments
We test our Essential Features approach against other ad-















Figure 7: Examples of BPDA+AG attacks and the result
when applying Essential Features’s transformation.
including adaptive PGD [22] and black-box [9] attacks. We
train Essential Features with ATTA-10 [35] training and
compare against undefended, Madry adversarially trained
networks, and vanilla ATTA-10 trainng.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and Models: We test our Essential Features
approach against the CIFAR-10 and RESISC45 datasets.
We use both Madry Adversarial Training (MAT) [22] and
ATTA [35] for training techniques and compare against
vanilla MAT and ATTA models. We chose RESISC45 be-
cause it is a 256x256 resolution dataset as compared to
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32x32 resolution in CIFAR-10. The types of images in
RESISC45 are also very different (remote sensing with 45
classes) than in CIFAR-10 (10 classes of animals and ob-
jects).
For CIFAR-10, we use the Wide ResNet 34-10 [32]
architecture commonly used in adversarial training tech-
niques [22, 34, 35]. For RESISC45, we use the ResNet-
34 [16] architecture.
Training Details: For both datasets, in our MAT base-
line, we train for 105 epochs, starting with a learning rate
of 0.1 and dividing by 10 at the intervals [75, 90, 100] [33].
For the remaining CIFAR-10 experiments, we train for 38
epochs, starting with a learning rate of 0.1 and dividing by
10 at epochs 30 and 35 [35]. For the remaining RESISC45
experiments, we train for 40 epochs with the same learning
rate schedule as CIFAR-10.
Essential Features Transformation Details: To compute
the edge responses we start by taking the gradient magni-
tude of the standard 3× 3 Sobel filters in the x and y direc-
tions. We normalize it by dividing by 1442.5 in the image
range of [0, 255], which is the maximal Sobel response for
x or y times square root 2.
To get the kernel decisions, we blur the Sobel map with
a Gaussian kernel of size 3. All Gaussian kernels are com-
puted with OpenCV (cv2) and the default standard deviation
for the chosen kernel size. For CIFAR-10, we use [1, 3, 5]
as our possible kernel sizes and for RESISC45 we use [3,
7, 13] as our possible kernel sizes. If the largest kernel is
the default, for RESISC45 we switch to the middle kernel
when the edge response is greater than 25 / 255 and switch
to the largest kernel when the edge response is greater than
55 / 255. For CIFAR-10, we use 15 / 255 and 55 / 255 for
the thresholds. We set k = 16 for RESISC45 to reduce the
image to 16 colors and set k = 32 for CIFAR-10.
Adaptive Attack Details: For our PGD-based attacks,
we use the L∞ version with the ε = 0.031 in [0-1] image
scaling. We adversarially train with 10 steps and test with
20 steps of size 0.007 [22, 35]. We evaluate on both adap-
tive PGD attacks and standard non-adaptive PGD attacks.
For adaptive attacks, we evaluate on BPDA attacks with the
identity function for the backwards approximation as well
as the BPDA+AG attack described in Section 3.4.
We also test against a black-box hard-label attack known
as OPT-attack [9] to provide a different style of attack and
expose potential gradient masking issues [6, 28]. We run
the L∞ version of OPT-attack with ε = 0.031. We evalu-
ate over 100 random samples for both datasets, due to time
constraints. We use the default parameters for CIFAR-10
and we use the default ResNet-50 ImageNet parameters for
RESISC45.
4.2 Experimental Results
The results of our experiments are shown in Table 1. For
RESISC45, we see that our Essential Features approach is
better in both natural and adversarial accuracy than either of
our MAT or ATTA baselines. The MAT and ATTA baselines
achieve 35.71% and 45.04% adversarial accuracy against
PGD attacks respectively while, even against adaptive at-
tacks, the Essential Features model achieves at least 58.13%
adversarial accuracy. Essential Features’s natural accuracy
is also over 5% higher than either of the other baselines.
We would expect Essential Features to be more success-
ful on larger datasets where there is more detail and we can
use larger kernels without blurring a high fraction of the ob-
ject at a time, but Essential Features also raises the worst-
case adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 to 64%, which is
higher than either of the 46.07% or 52.32% PGD accura-
cies by the MAT and ATTA baselines. The natural accuracy
does drop a little bit, which is not too surprising given the
low resolution.
OPT-attack achieving the most attack success rate merits
further observation, as it can be a sign of gradient mask-
ing. OPT-attack works by interpolating between victim and
candidate target images to find the distance to the boundary
in that perturbation direction, and then applying gradient-
free techniques to minimize the boundary distance. We note
that on all of the successful attacks, the attacks were already
successful by the end of the initialization stage. Thus, OPT-
attack was not successful because of its ability to optimize
with gradient-free optimization; rather, it was successful be-
cause it found interpolations in these small resolution im-
ages that fooled the classifier. Thus, we think it is not in-
dicative of mass gradient masking and rather a byproduct of
the lower resolution.
To further suggest there is not too much gradient mask-
ing, we show in Figure 8 an accuracy over size of pertur-
bation graph for our Essential Features RESISC45 model.
We use PGD-20 as in the rest of the experiments but vary
the size of ε [6]. As we get to larger and larger epsilons
such as 0.5 (which means that any image can be made to
a neutral gray [6]) the accuracy drops to 0. Thus, there is
not huge evidence of mass gradient masking from this plot
either.
It is perhaps a bit surprising that OPT-attack is not more
successful on the undefended network, but given that Cheng
et al. evaluated their L∞ attack for ImageNet [11] on ε =
0.15 and ε = 0.3, it is not too surprising that a larger ε
would be needed.
4.3 Ablation Studies
In Table 2, we show the result of different variations of
Essential Features. We compare our Essential Features ap-
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Table 1: Robustness of defenses against a variety of attacks. In each of the datasets, the L∞ budget is 0.031. For OPT-attack,













CIFAR-10 None 94.47% 0.0% — — 23%
Madry Adv. Training 86.35% 46.07% — — 82%
ATTA Adv. Training 83.96% 52.32% — — 77%
Essential Features
(ATTA) 81.86% 76.49% 67.65% 74.65% 64%
RESISC45 None 91.84% 0.0% — — 92%
Madry Adv. Training 81.82% 35.71% — — 69%
ATTA Adv. Training 82.78% 45.04% — — 72%
Essential Features
(ATTA) 88.49% 87.38% 82.76% 58.13% 72%
Table 2: Ablation of Essential Features variants on RESISC45. For OPT-attack, we report the accuracy over 100 random












Adapt. Blur 84.00% 82.13% 71.07% 42.95% 77%
k-means Color Red. 83.6% 52.56% 47.4% — 66%
Fixed Blur + k-means Color Red. 87.00% 86.31% 79.56% 53.53% 69%
Adapt. Blur + k-means Color Red. 88.49% 87.38% 82.76% 58.13% 72%
Figure 8: This figures shows accuracy over size of perturba-
tion in terms of epsilon. As epsilon gets to higher and higher
numbers, the attack begins to succeed more, suggesting that
the gradient approximations in our attack are reasonable.
proach with just adaptive blur, just k-means, and with fixed
Gaussian blur + k-means, similar to Jalalpour et al. [17].
We use a kernel size of 7 for the fixed Gaussian blur. We
use ATTA-10 as before in previous Essential Features ex-
periments and we conduct this on RESISC45. We test with
PGD and BPDA as before along with BPDA+AG for the
adaptive blur models and BPDA+G for the fixed blur, which
uses identity function for the backwards k-means function
and then differentiates exactly through the blur function.
Essential Features as presented in Section 3 outperforms
all of the alternatives on natural, PGD, identity function
BPDA, and on blurring attacks. The worst-case accuracy
on these attacks of Essential Features at 58.13% is higher
than the other approaches by around 5%. This suggests that
both adaptive blur and k-means color reduction contribute
meaningfully to creating a robust feature space.
5 Conclusion
We propose Essential Features, a robust content-aware
image preprocessing technique that reduces the attack sur-
face for adversarial attack. To accomplish this, Essential
Features adaptively blurs an image to preserve edges and
to maximally smooth areas of low features before passing
it to k-means approach to reduce the color space by using
a representative color palette. This transformation creates
a robust feature space that limits the attacker’s color influ-
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ence and ability to add high frequency noise in the middle
of objects. By combining with adversarial training tech-
niques, we are able to raise robustness on the CIFAR-10 and
RESISC45 datasets, even under various adaptive white-box
and black-box attacks. We significantly improved the adver-
sarial robustness on both CIFAR-10 and RESISC45, even
against adaptive attacks. We raise robustness up to 64%
on CIFAR-10 and up to 58.13% on RESISC45, over 10%
against Madry and ATTA adversarial training baselines.
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